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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we consider how conservation has arisen as a key aspect of the 
reaction to human-initiated degradation and disappearance of ecosystems, 
wild lands. and wildlife. Concern over species extinction is given an historical 
perspective which shows the way in which pressure on wild and natural aspects 
of global ecology have changed in recent centuries. The role of conservation 
in the stnlggle to protect the environment is then analysed using underlying 
ethical arguments behind the economic, ecological and rights based 
justifications given for conservation. The moral considerability of species and 
individuals is reviewed and different positions contrasted, most importantly 
utilitarianism versus rights. A central argument with primary influence over 
economics is the utilitarian justification for action and this is explored with 
reflection upon the use of monetary valuation. Rights are then explored and 
the use of consequentialism in adjudicating different rights claims introduced. 
Human preferences can be seen as practically powerful in justifying 
conservation policy decisions. even when an animal-centred ethic has been 
adopted. Yet ecological and non-consequentialist expressions of concern 
characterise the entire problem in fundamentally different ways, e.g. 
biodiversity and ecosystems maintenance versus marginal species loss, 
designation of wilderness areas versus management ofparklands. Leaving the 
wild in wilderness and the natural in Nature cannot then be reduced to 
preference utilitarianism as in the economic calculus. 
GLOSSARY 
Biodiversity The biological diversity of life described in tenns of the range 
and type of genes, species, and ecosystems on the planet Earth. 
Conservation The act of preserving, guarding or protecting from loss, decay, 
injury or violation. 
Contingent Valuation A sUlVey method used by economists to place a 
monetary value on non-market goods such as wildlife and 
aesthetics. 
Species 
Wildlife 
A biological grouping which shares a common pool of genes, 
the basic units of heredity, e.g., allowing successful 
interbreeding for bisexual organisms. 
Life found m an original undisturbed state, without 
domestication, cultivation or taming; cornmonly used with 
implicit reference to vertebrates. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wildlife conservation is a reaction to the increasing loss of species the rate of 
which has accelerated dramatically this century. Species loss has been highlighted 
by some notable cases of extinction and near extinction in recent centuries, such as 
the Dodo and the American Buffalo. In this century, large marmnals and 
predatory birds have tended to be a focus for popular attention with non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) trying to protect whales, lions, tigers, pandas 
and eagles. However, this has tended to treat wildlife conservation from a narrow 
vertebrate species perspective which risks neglecting the growing concern over 
ecosystem structure. Given the underlying concern for preserving life in a wild 
state, restricting attention to large readily identifiable species will clearly be 
inadequate, but is a result of a consequentialist tendency. That is reference to the 
preferences of the general public for guidance on how wildlife conservation is to 
proceed tends to lead to the neglect of plants, reptiles, insects and micro-
organisms. The conservation of such wild, untamed life requires the recognition 
of the interdependence of plant and animal species mix in detennining the 
ecological resilience of wildlife. Thus, wildlife conservation has moved from the 
idea that key species could be preserved in zoos to the protection of ecosystems, 
while NGOs involved in the area have transfonned from passive clubs for the 
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study of natural history to active lobby groups for the environment and the 
maintenance ofbiodiversity. 
Along with this dawning recognition of the breadth of trying to conserve wildlife 
has been a growing concern for the treatment of the wilder side of Earth by 
humans. As long as the losses driving the conservation movement were infrequent 
and localised they could be regarded as having limited and estimable 
consequences for humans. A general lack of concern is then a reflection of the 
relative weight given to species loss over other goals in human society and the low 
priority of the resulting loss. Today this has been refined to a high degree in the 
application by some economists of monetary valuation of the costs and benefits of 
species extinction. However, an alternative underlying motivation for wildlife 
conservation has been the protection of animal rights. While conservation of 
objects for identifiable ends is the central theme in the consequentialist approach, 
under a rights based system more turns upon the rights ofnon-human life forms to 
be wild and have self determination. The relative dominance of these two 
motivations is particularly relevant to the way in which wildlife conservation 
develops in the future. 
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2. THE NEED FOR CONSERVATION 
2.1 Historical Roots of Concern 
(i) Creation 
About two millennia ago, the Roman poet Lucretius wrote about the changing 
world he saw around him and in particular mentioned ideas akin to those of 
Charles Darwin. That is he recognised features in the species he saw which had 
allowed them to survive, e.g., the cunning of the fox, the prowess of the lion and 
the speed of the stag in flight. Some species survived under human protection 
because of their usefulness to humanity. Others were theorised to have perished. 
Today this is unremarkable. 
However, in the intervening period the dominance of Christian theology meant the 
suppression of such ideas as extinction. In the story interpreted from biblical texts 
God had given all creatures to man for his stewardship at the time of the creation 
and they had all been aboard Noah's Ark. There was an absence of the notion that 
species might become, or had become, extinct. This perspective became strong in 
the meclieval period. 
Despite the Protestant movement weakening the central authority of the Pope little 
change in the official story occurred. In fact Martin Luther reinforced the line that 
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all animals and fish appeared at once upon the word of God. The date of this 
creation was estimated a hundred years later by Archbishop James Ussher of 
Annagh, Ireland, as 4004 BC. This date persisted as a defence of the theory of 
creation and was employed by the English naturalist Philip Gosse in his book of 
1857 on the subject. 
However, the repeated discovery of dinosaur bones and skeletons cast doubt on 
the creation theory from the 18th Century onwards. In the 19th Century the theories 
of evolutionists such as Darwin took hold. Thus, no longer could the mysterious 
skeletons be regarded as animals that missed the boat (Noah' s Ark) from the 
antediluvian era. The importance of this change in thinking was that now causes 
of extinction became a topic for discussion and soon concern. 
(ii) Extinctioll 
While extinction is regarded to be a nonnal evolutionary process the rate of 
extinction induced by humans is of concern. Several causes of species loss over 
geological time have been postulated including climate change, ice ages, inter-
species competition, and catastrophic events such as the impact of a giant 
meteorite. Fossil records show about nine mass extinctions in the past. 
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About 1,500 million years ago, the trilobite was the dominant life fOnTI. This crab 
like creature took on a variety of fonns and sizes but largely died out about 500 
million years ago taking a million years to do so. Around 250 million years ago, 
an extinction took place in which 50 per cent of all species are estimated to have 
become extinct with 96 per cent marine, 75 per cent amphibian, 80 per cent 
reptilian life forms disappearing. The dinosaurs were dominant for around 150 
million years becoming extinct 65 to 70 million years ago. Mammals have been 
the most recent dominant species group arising over the last 25 million years or so, 
with the rise of mankind slowly in the last million years. 
Mankind as a hunter may have aided in the destruction of species over the last 50 
thousand years or more. For example, the first human migration in to the New 
World (North America) is estimated to have occurred about 35 thousand years 
ago. Large mammal species which had disappeared elsewhere but survived here 
then disappeared, probably aided by a warming climate. Similar mass extinctions 
are found in relation to the arrival of mankind in Australia and New Guinea 
50,000 years before present, and in New ZeaJand less than a millermia ago with 
the extinction of large species of bird (e.g. the giant moa), lizard, frog and fur 
seals. 
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The reason for concern over extinction today is the rapid growth in its rate. By the 
middle of the 20th Century two species of animal were being lost every year and 
plant species were disappearing at similar or higher rates. Other wild life fonns 
such as insects and micro-organisms have been neg1ected in this regard so their 
losses are unrecorded. 
2.2 Conservation and Causes of Species Loss 
(i) Diversity and Species Interdependence 
About 1.7 million organisms have been identified and named; their distribution is 
6 per cent in boreal and polar latitudes, 59 per cent in temperate zones and 35 per 
cent in the tropics. However, there is a great ignorance as to the global diversity of 
species and attempting to account for the undescribed organisms thought to exist 
places the tropics as holding 86 per cent of global species. Species are 
interdependent in such a way as to make insects and invertebrates the building 
blocks and glue in existing habitat structure. Wildlife conservation projects often 
concentrate upon large vertebrates or admired plants while neglecting these other 
life fonus. For example, in tropical forests insects are important because they: are 
the primary food for most small carnivores, are predators of seeds influencing 
species composition, and influence the structure and functioning of the ecosystem. 
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(ii) Extinction and Extermination 
Extinction can have non-human causes such as random catastrophic events, 
biological interactions (e.g., competition, disease, predation), physical stress, and 
frequent disturbance. The process of extinction prior to the dominance of 
mankind was a gradual one requiring millennia. Human induced extinction is 
therefore in a different class as the process can be extremely rapid requiring a few 
decades. Thus, some distinguish this anthropocentric extinction process by 
terming it 'extennination'. This term appJies aptly to the dodo, the North American 
passenger pigeon, the great auk (the penguin of the northern hemisphere), and the 
giant moa of New Zealand. Some of these stories of extennination are apocryphal, 
others so well documented the names of the hunters who killed the last live 
individuals of the species is known. 
In general, human induced extinction was historically due to hunting beyond the 
natural growth rates of species. However, the rapid rate of species extinction this 
century has been due to the increasingly widespread impact of human activities. 
The introduction of foreign species has been foremost amongst causes of 
extennination, e.g. introducing terrestrial mammals to New Zealand. Destruction 
of and encroachment upon habitat are now of great concern, and form the focus of 
attention in tropical forest conservation. 
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Chemical and organic pollutants, acidic deposition and general reductions in 
environmental quality all stress spedes if they are able to survive in the altered 
environment. The highlighting of this pollutant cause of extinction occurred most 
forcefully in the 1960s with the focus upon what was seen as the indiscriminate 
use of pesticides (herbicides and insecticides) by the agro-chemical industry. In 
particular, the scare over the use of DDT and the publication of Silent Spring by 
Rachel Carson in 1962 lead to legislation in the United States. These are 
persistent and widespread problems which go far beyond the agricultural sector. 
The build up of heavy metals, nitrates and acidic deposition has altered entire 
regions. Persistent pollutants have been released in to the envirorunent so that 
damage to the genes of wild species has been occurring, leading to infertility, 
deformed and/or dead young. 
(iii) Concern fOT Conservation 
Wildlife conservation can be regarded as being based on one or more of three 
fundamental reasons. First, is the primarily economic argument. Humans are part 
of a larger environment with which they interact. This means wildlife provides a 
source of human welfare from food and clothing through to aesthetic and spiritual 
enrichment. In this way wildlife conservation is seen to preserve the potential for 
future human happiness via the uses which can be made of that wildlife in order to 
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create improvements in utility. Wildlife loss is then primarily of concern because 
it removes the ability of humans to benefit by exploiting biocherrrical, ecological 
and other wildlife properties. Second, is the related consequentialist but 
ecological concern over the role wildlife plays in ecosystem functioning, stability 
and resilience. The emphasis here is upon the interdependencies of species and 
the potential for ecosystems and their functions to be destroyed to the ultimate 
detriment of humanity. Because the ecological importance of any given species, 
in nutrient cycles, ecosystem productivity and structure, is largely unlmown, 
precaution is suggested by this justification for wildlife conservation. Thir~ the 
concern is raised that wildlife extermination is a violation of species and other 
rights which humans have a duty to respect. However, before these viewpoints 
can be explored the issue of which life fonns are to be given moral consideration 
must be addressed. 
3. WHOSE LIFE IS TO BE CONSERVED AND ON WHAT GROUNDS? 
3.1 Species and Individuals 
Two preliminary distinctions are required. First, between ethics which focus on 
conservation of a whole species and ethics which attend directly to individual 
members of that species. The concerns of wildlife conservationists have 
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increasingly centred around entire species, on the basis of the consequences of 
species extinction - and thus the depletion of global biodiversity - for the planet. 
The question then arises of whether 'the health of the planet' is taken to matter 
in and of itself, or because this would adversely affect human quality of life. 
The second, related, distinction is between the view that extinction of species (or 
individuals) is bad in itself, no matter what the consequences, and the view that 
the negativity of such an outcome derives from its consequences, which violate 
some other ethical principle. The possible consequences and principles will 
depend on the range of entities which enter into direct moral consideration. 
Consider some endangered species of elephant. The extinction of each 
individual elephant may be held to be of moral concern, or only the extinction of 
the entire species, but our answer to this question tends to depend on a prior one 
- whether the elephants matter only insofar as their survival affects the interests 
of humans, or whether the interests of the elephants themselves are held to be 
worth considering. That is: are humans the only morally considerable creatures 
or are elephants also morally considerable? 
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3.2 Five Accounts of Moral Considerability 
There are at least five basic accounts of the range of moral considerability: it can 
be limited to humans alone, or extended to al1 vertebrates, to all living creatures, 
to non-living things, or even to whole ecosystems. The account adopted wil1 
have imp1ications for the way in which wildlife conservation is put into effect. 
0) Only Human Interests Count 
In theory, human interests could be the sole concern in a variety of moral 
philosophies e.g., only human rights count. However, in wildlife conservation 
this ethic tends to be reflected as a variant of utilitarianism where the interest of 
humans alone is involved in the maximisation of happiness as the goal of 
society. An endangered species, such as the elephant, matters only insofar as its 
survival affects the sum total of happiness and unhappiness among humans in 
the society. Logically the next step for wildlife conservation policy is to obtain 
infonnation about the effects on human happiness of the extinction of the 
threatened species, and this is discussed in the section on utilitarianism below. 
(U) Irtcluding All Vertebrates 
This ethic implies that all vertebrates (mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish) 
are morally considerable, so that the direct consequences for the well-being of 
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the affected animals should be taken into account when fonnulating wildlife 
conservation policies. Adversely affecting the interests of vertebrates is to be 
taken into account, even if the demise of the individual or species is judged to be 
of no importance to present or future generations of humans. 
Note that the centre of attention here is the individual animal rather than the 
species as a whole. Since vertebrates are held to enter into the moral calculus in 
their own right, they count as individuals for their own sake, rather than merely 
as a means to the end of conserving their species. Thus, perhaps contrary to 
expectations, this animal-centred ethic only provides indirect justification for 
wildlife conservation. Avoiding arbitrariness entails that equal interests are 
treated equally, so that, for instance, all adult elephants of a particular species 
will be granted equal moral considerability regardless of whether the species is 
threatened with extinction. In contrast, the wildlife conservation perspective 
makes species conservation the fundamental objective, implying that individuals 
in the set of elephants, which together form a viable population to maintain the 
species, count for more than 'marginal' elephants which may be added to this 
set. 
Vertebrate-centred ethics may be subdivided further according to the categories 
of animals which are granted moral considerability. This may be limited to only 
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those higher mammals which have some form of self consciousness (e.g., apes, 
dolphins), or include all mammals, or be extended to include fish as well. 
Although the notion of wildlife conservation typically brings to mind images of 
furred creatures, most animals do not confonn to this picture. In fact, in tenns of 
numbers, the biologist Robert May has noted "as a rough approximation, every 
living thing on Earth is an insect", which raises the next ethical position. 
(Hi) Every Living Thing has Standing 
Ethics of this form aim to represent the interests of all living things, including 
invertebrates, plants, single-celled organisms, perhaps even viruses. Usually 
such arguments reject the claim that all living things are of equal moral 
significance, even if they all possess moral considerability. Judgements of the 
relative goodness of protecting an endangered species of mammal, as opposed to 
an endangered species of tree, will finally depend on a detailed evaluation of the 
consequences of these two preservation options. Such evaluation takes place on 
a case-by-case basis; nothing in general can be said about the relative moral 
significance of say mammals as opposed to other living things. An exception to 
this is the form of life-centred ethic sometimes known as biotic egalitarianism 
where all living things count equally, as discussed by Arnae Naess in his book 
Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. A problem with 
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such an approach in the current context is that it seems rughly unlikely to be able 
to infonn wildlife conservation decision-making: biotic egalitarianism would 
allow only quantitative comparisons - that two living things count for more than 
one - and hence almost all forms of human management of the natural 
environment would be ruled out. 
(iv) Consider All Natural Entities 
Despite this last point, some go even further in widening the scope of moral 
considerability. Non-living entities such as mountains or rocks, might be 
granted consideration 'for their own sake'. Such ethics have met with a 
considerable degree of scepticism, so it is important to emphasise that they make 
no attempt to discern a consciousness among rocks, or establish that a rock is 
striving unconsciously to achieve certain goals and therefore can be said to have 
interests. Rather, these ethics aim to provide support for the idea that certain 
activities such as mining might be \VTong simply because of the damage they do 
to the fabric of the natural world, even though no living things might be affected. 
(v) Ecological Holism 
Ecological holism represents the culmination of the VIew that humans have 
certain duties towards the preservation of the natural world; nature itself should 
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be preserved as far as possible rather than any particular entities within it. Thus, 
ecological holism counts whole ecosystems and the wider biosphere as morally 
considerable. It is particularly associated with AIdo Leopold's 'Land Ethic', 
famously elaborated in J. Baird Callicotfs In Defense of the Land Ethic. The 
distinctive feature of this position is the shift of emphasis from part to whole, 
from individual to community. According to this view, the extinction of some 
species of wildlife would not matter because it entailed the demise of individual 
members of the species, nor would it matter for its own sake. Instead it matters 
only insofar as it undennines the sustainability of the ecosystem as a whole. 
Thus the land ethic is concerned more with endangered species than less 
threatened ones, and largely indifferent to the plight of domestic animals. More 
starkly, the violence of the predator-prey relationship cannot ue said to serve the 
interests of the prey and hence will be regretted by some animal-centred ethics, 
but it is a relationship Leopold respects and would not disturb. Clearly, an ethic 
of ecological holism directly supports the shift towards biodiversity maintenance 
rather than species conservation. 
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3.3 Implications of Moral Considerability 
(i) Contrasts between Different Approaches 
The different environmental ethics outlined briefly here have a number of 
implications for wildlife conservation. If only humans are morally considerable, 
then specific species should be preserved only to the extent that a desire for this 
is reflected in human preferences. As noted above, moral considerability for 
vertebrates gives individual animals standing, which may conflict with the aim 
of wildlife conservation to maximise the number of species preserved. This is 
particularly so when the specific fonn of animal ethic in question limits moral 
considerability to a number of key species, such as 'representative' higher 
mammals. A situation might arise where the dominance of such key species in 
their habitat threatens to lead to the extinction of another species which is 
ignored according to the ethic. Alternatively, the limited culling of members of 
a key species could be sanctioned in order to ensure the survival of the other 
threatened species, but this would violate the vertebrate-centred ethic. 
A similar problem arises when the domain of moral considerability, according to 
an ethic, is wider than that implicit in traditional wildlife conservation policy. 
Increasingly vertebrate-centred ethics extend moral consideration beyond a 
limited number of higher marrunals to include all those creatures which, in some 
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meaningful sense, have the capacity to suffer. In contrast, the traditional wildlife 
conservation approach seeks to preserve key species at the expense of others. 
Ethics which consider all living orgamsms as valuable for their own sake 
obviously make much stronger claims on us than the wildlife conservation 
perspective. However the latter may sanction similar environmental policies to 
these broader ethics, because the objective of species preservation demands that 
a balanced, fully functioning habitat for the species is maintainecL which in 
many cases will ensure the flourishing of plants and other organisms just as 
readily as attending to them for their own sake. On the other hand, the 
preservation of species in zoos and plants in seed banks is equally valid under 
the wildlife conservation approach, but is often not supported by broader ethics. 
As noted, ecological holism supports biodiversity maintenance rather than 
species conservation but when combined with other ethics it may yield a position 
much closer to the practice of wildlife conservation. For instance, ecological 
holism and an animal-centred ethic taken together imply policy measures should 
focus on the preservation of those animal species which support biodiversity and 
other aspects of the flourishing of the ecosystem. 
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(if) Human-centred versus Animal-centred Ethics 
The differences between a narrow anthropocentric viewpoint and the wider 
views outlined above have been dominant in policy debate. In sum, a human-
centred ethic depends on individual preferences for conservation while an 
animal-centred ethic offers at least the possibility of supporting wildlife 
conservation measures directly. However in practice this difference is more 
apparent than real because of the impossibility of directly measuring the interests 
of animals. Policy-makers will often rely on human value judgements to 
determine the extent to which a given conservation proposal serves the interests 
of the animals. Yet none of the five basic positions described above seem to 
correspond closely to the kinds of human value judgements which are made to 
justify wildlife conservation. 
In particular, the ethics of wildlife conservation have become inextricably 
interlinked with contemporary debates over 'animal rights', with most ethical 
questions being couched in 'animal rights' language. This is partly due to the 
dominance of a rights-based discourse thrOUghOllt the ethical debate, particularly 
in the United States. Such rights are seen to facilitate clear and readily 
understood 'rules-of-thumb' concerning which actions are sanctioned and which 
are prohibited, rather than requiring lengthy debate on a case-by-case basis. The 
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extent to which the animal rights perspective supports wildlife conservation can 
be examined and contrasted with a utilitarian basis for policy. 
4. UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS 
4.1 The Case for Concern 
The utilitarian argument for wildlife conservation recognises mankind as the cause 
of the deliberate destruction of large numbers of species. The question is whether 
some species are more useful than others and therefore deserve to be saved, i.e., 
whether scarce resources should be used to save them. This in turn implies 
prioritising species in order of destruction potential. Norman Myers supports this 
argument in his book The Sinking Ark where he rejects saving species "come what 
may". For him and others the issue is whose needs are served by the conservation 
of species, and how does saving a species enhance the long-tenn welfare of 
humans. 
4.2 Ethical Basis of Consequential Conservation 
The consequentialist rationale for wildlife conservation is forced to address 
ethical concerns despite the tendency of economists valuing wildlife to avoid 
these issues. Similarly, wildlife conservation on the grounds of the scientific 
value ofbiodiversity still ultimately rests on how much 'better' a future world in 
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which that value is preserved would be compared to alternative futures. No 
matter how 'better' is defmed, an ethical claim is being made. 
A consequentialist view of the value of animals adopts a different account of 
moral considerability from the rights based approach: it expressly holds that the 
moral significance of preserving different animals will depend on the 
consequences of such acts of preservation. Moreover, unlike the animal rights 
account which necessarily assumes an animal-centred ethic, a consequentialist 
view of the value of animals may be couched either in terms of the animal-
centred ethic, or be limited to a human-centred ethic alone. Put another way, the 
consequentialist account may consider only those consequences which affect 
humans (including the adverse effects on human well-being which arise from the 
implications for animals of some action), or extend to consequences which affect 
the interests of animals directly, regardless of whether these consequences have 
any effect on human well-being. 
Historically, the most influential verslOn of consequentialism has been 
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is egalitarian in the sense that it considers equally 
the interests of all beings affected by an action. In particular, it considers 
equally the abilities of all beings to suffer. As Jeremy Bentham WTote in The 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789: "The day may come when the rest 
22 
of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been 
withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny ... The question is not, Can 
they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" (p. 273). 
In modem times, Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, has perhaps been the most 
influential of those offering a more sophisticated utilitarian defence of the value 
of animals. Singer's approach, as a version of consequential ism, evaluates 
consequences in teImS of the extent to which they satisfy the preferences of the 
agents granted moral considerability. Following Bentham, this is defined to be 
all creatures with the capacity to suffer. This evaluation of preference 
satisfaction can become quite complicated. 
Some of the ethical problems with this approach can be illustrated by the 
following example. Five survivors are in a lifeboat, which only has the capacity 
to support four. All weigh approximately the same and would take up 
approximately the same amount of capacity. Four of the five are normal adult 
human beings, while the fifth is a dog. If one must be thrown over board to 
prevent all five perishing, whom shall it be? For instance, throwing anyone of 
the humans overboard will not only fail to satisfy the presumed preference of the 
individual for continued existence, but cause great suffering to that individual's 
family and friends. In addition, the argument is made that although both dogs 
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and humans have the capacity to suffer, the total amount of suffering 
experienced by a human during the course of anything other than an 
instantaneous death exceeds that of a dog. By contrast, all such consequential 
considerations are irrelevant if all individuals have the right to life: the non-
consequentialist approach to the lifeboat example will be discussed below. 
4.3 Monetary Valuation of Wildlife 
Here the influence of modern market economics is felt, with its emphasis on the 
sovereignty of the consumer, whose decisions about his or her purchases - or 
sources of happiness - are to be respected, rather than ovenuled by the moral 
philosopher. Thus, in seeking information about the consequences of some 
potential species extinction for human happiness, policy makers increasingly 
twn to environmental economists, who in turn refer to individual preference 
information. As with items of food, clothing, and other commodities, a market 
for conservation of, say, elephants is envisaged. The extent of consumer demand 
for elephant conservation in that market is then taken as a proxy measure of how 
much human happiness is affected. As no such elephant conservation market 
actually exists consumer preferences are measured in hypothetical markets 
where monetary valuations are gained on the basis of contingent factors; a 
process termed the contingent valuation method. 
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The contingent valuation method (CVM) involves the direct questioning of 
individuals by means of a survey, typically to obtain how much the individual 
would be willing to pay to ensure the protection of some endangered species of 
wildlife, or, far less commonly, how much they would be willing to accept in 
compensation if the species were exterminated. Three elements can then be 
identified. (i) A description of the species and habitat to be valued, which may 
be detailed enough to include a schedule giving the probabilities that various 
numbers of the species will survive if preservation is attempted. (ii) A method 
by which payment or compensation will be made. (iii) A method of eliciting the 
monetary values. In a survey of 20 V.S. studies, covering 18 rare, threatened 
and endangered species, per household preservation costs fell well below the 
benefits revealed in the hypothetical contingent market, even for the most 
expensive project. Armual willingness to pay ranged from a low of $6 per 
household for fish such as the Striped Shiner to $95 for the Northern Spotted 
Owl and its old growth habitat (see, for example, J akobsson & Dragun 1996; 
Loomis & White 1996). 
Non-economists are often surprised by the apparent crudeness of contingent 
valuation, but the VS District Court of Appeals has upheld the values obtained, a 
'bIue-riband' panel assembled by the VS National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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Administration (including three Nobel Laureate economists) has endorsed the 
method, and test-retest reliability studies confion internal validity. The result of 
refinement has been to achieve statutory requirement in the US whenever 
compensation following industrial accidents is to be detennined. More 
importantly for wildlife conservation, the US Congress, in re-authorising the 
Endangered Species Act, may detennine that a cost-benefit analysis, and by 
implication contingent valuation, is required to support a listing decision. 
There are many econonuc criticisms and corresponding refinements in the 
literature on contingent valuation, and more generally cost-benefit analysis (see 
Han1ey and Spash 1993). Ethical criticisms have been much more fundamental, 
including claims that: (i) the procedure treats species preservation as a good 
which is 'consumed' merely for the uses and facilities it provides; (ii) 
environmental species cannot be itemised as conunodities of monetary value; 
(iil) respondents are neither willing nor able to make trade-offs between species 
preservation and monetary alternatives. Environmental economists have largely 
ignored objections (li) and (iii). Their response to (i) has been to try to capture 
'existence value' in their surveys, meaning the value to an individual of some 
species quite apart from that associated with any actual or potential use of it by 
that individual. This derives from the satisfaction of knowing that a particular 
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species simply continues to exist, that is, with a sustainable population in its 
native habitat. 
Existence value appears to admit the possibility of an animal-centred ethic, albeit 
one where, by default, the judgements of individuals are relied upon to 
determine the interests of the animals. Certainly the many definitions of 
existence value in the literature reflect an attempt to capture a value which goes 
beyond the direct interests of humans in species preservation. Humans may 
recognise values which are lll1Ielated to either human interests or those of an 
extended moral community including animals. Examples involve the language 
of awe, reverence and respect rather than benefit and cost. They include our 
wonder at the marvel of a setting sun, or the sense of raw nature in a wilderness 
area. The danger here is that CVM, in focusing on the narrow consequences for 
humans of a wildlife conservation proposal, will overlook altogether the broader 
ways in which we value nature. Bemard Williams concludes: "the human 
concern for other, non-human and non-animal, effects is misrepresented if one 
tries to reduce it simply to a kind of human self-concern" (Williams 1995, p. 
235). 
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5. RIGHTS AND WILD THINGS 
S.l The Animal Rights Case 
Attributing rights to animals is a particular form of animal-centred ethic rather 
than upholding a more general view that animals deserve moral consideration. 
Rights-based approaches to ethics are non-consequentialist and thus often 
associated with Kant, although a position whlch treats rights rather than 
obligations as fundamental can only be loosely described as Kantian. Kant in 
Lectures on Ethics (1930, p. 239) nevertheless showed concern for animals: 
"The more we come in contact with animals the more we love them, for we see 
how great is their concern for their young. It is then difficult for us to be cruel in 
thought even to a wolf." A classic modem defence of animal rights is Tom 
Regan's The Case for Animal Rights. Regan essentially holds that only beings 
with inherent value have rights. Inherent value is the value that the being 
possesses independently of its value to others. For the purposes of the 
discussion here, this may be understood as equivalent to a creature being morally 
considerable. Only self-conscious beings, deliberate actors capable of having 
beliefs, desires and goals for the future, can have inherent value. Regan holds 
that all mammals over a year of age, ifnot mentally defective, can have inherent 
value on this definition, and thus possess rights. Animal rights are universal 
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moral rights, rather than legal rights, so they remain the same as we move from 
one human society to another. What then is the difference between the animal 
rights ethic and the argument, discussed above, that 'all animals' are morally 
considerable? 
5.2 Rights and Moral Considerability 
Crucially, on most rights-based approaches, all beings with inherent value have 
it equally; thus rights are not possessed to differing degrees by rights-bearers. 
Although this position has the virtue of being egalitarian, it faces difficulties 
when there are conflicts between rights. In contrast, the notion of moral 
considerability makes no claim about the relative moral significance of different 
creatures, and allows for variations in the degree of consideration attributed to 
different agents. Thus, the animal rights approach represents a particular 
account of moral considerability. 
We can return to the lifeboat example to analyse the conflicts between rights in 
that situation. Regan argues that the dog must be sacrificed, because the hann 
done to the dog, if thrown overboard, is less than that done to a human, in 
throwing one of them overboard. Indeed, Regan goes further by maintaining 
that, in general, sacrificing any number of dogs would be better than the death of 
29 
four humans. Animal rights activists might reject this approach because of the 
downgrading of the animals' relative position and the weighing up of 
consequences. In this case, making a choice between conflicting rights results in 
an appeal to welfare consequences. Human capacity for suffering is then judged 
greater than that of dogs therefore humans are to be preserved in preference to 
dogs. For wildlife conservation policy, this account leaves open the possibility 
that, for instance, some species of elephant should be extenninated if it threatens 
the survival of some species of higher primate. 
5.3 Animal Rights versus Consequentialism 
(i) Similarities 
The preference utilitarian may reach the same conclusions in the lifeboat 
example as Regan does with his rights-based account. This is surprising given 
the traditional antagonism between consequentialist and non-consequentialist 
right-based ethics. Certainly in principle the positions of Regan and Singer are 
capable of reaching very different conclusions. However in practice - and this 
includes issues of wildlife conservation - the two theoretical approaches in their 
more plausible formulations will often lead to convergent policy 
reconunendations. Consider a species of elephant which is threatened with 
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extinction by a development proposal which would destroy its habitat. Singer's 
interpretation of preference utilitarianism would almost certainly rule out this 
proposal because of the adverse consequences of the species' extinction for: (a) 
the elephants themselves, (b) animals in their ecological community dependent 
on the elephants' continued existence, and (c) human welfare. These 
considerations might weigh so heavily in the utilitarian scales that it would be 
almost impossible to outweigh them. This problem is easy to resol ve in terms of 
Regan's position: saving the elephants does not, it is assumed, involve the 
sacrifice of any other species, so the utmost must be done to save them. 
(ii) Problems alld Differences 
The language of rights may be an unpromising expression of our concern for 
animals, because that language is designed with 'nonnal' adult humans in mind. 
For example, rights of ownership can only have meaning in a conununity of 
agents who recognise that they owe to each other, and are owed by each other, 
certain fonns of behaviour. How animals are to become full members of such a 
moral community is unresolved because they lack certain capacities of the 
archetypal rights-bearer, such as the ability to negotiate conflicts of interest, to 
plan, choose and accept responsibility for actions. However, this criticism of 
animal rights is easily extended to rule out rights for young children and 
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mentally defective adult humans. This leaves the critique valid, but requires an 
explanation of the wider implications, and, for example, how a line can be drawn 
between animals and humans lacking some key capacities of a rights-bearer. 
Perhaps more worrymg for Regan' s animal rights account is its apparent 
tendency to contradict itself. The rights-based account grants by definition equal 
moral significance to those creatures treated as morally considerable, yet, in 
adjudicating between competing rights claims in the lifeboat example, some 
animals are to be regarded as more equal than others. Moreover, in deciding that 
the dog should be thrown overboard, Regan appears to justify this decision on 
consequentialist grounds - in terms of relative hanns. These difficulties will be 
side-stepped by a rights-based account which denies the eventual trade-offs in 
terms of relative harms which Regan admits when detennining which creatures 
should be sacrificed. But such an approach still needs to determine how a 
decision is to be made when there are conflicting rights. Regan' s account will be 
equally powerless when neither of the conflicting rights are rights to life. In the 
earlier example, the proposed development might significantly increase the 
nutritional intake of numbers of humans living at subsistence level, but erode the 
habitat of the elephant, perhaps leading to greater competition for food amongst 
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elephants. The rights-based account appears unable to resolve this dilemma 
without some appeal to consequences. 
If the rights-based justification for wildlife conservation must In practice 
perform some, albeit constrained, evaluation of consequences, then the 
evaluation procedure will be crucial. Granting that all animals are morally 
considerable is inadequate. One debate here revolves around the efficacy of 
using scientific experts to determine animal interests. If, as with humans, these 
interests lack a specific, 'correct', form and sympathy with the animals' way of 
life is mainly required, then the judgement of experts would be unnecessarily 
privileged over that of lay people. Despite adopting an animal-centred ethic, the 
justification for wildlife conservation may still come to turn on human 
preferences. The danger here is that this preference information may be too 
impoverished, or too wrreliable, to capture certain aspects of our concern for 
wildlife. Thus, for wildlife conservation policy in practice, the re1evance of 
preference information, and the means by which consequences are measured 
more generally, may matter more than whether the underlying conservation ethic 
is rights-based or consequentialist. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Wildlife has formed a focus for envirorunental concern with considerable 
emphasis placed upon protecting specific species of vertebrates, e.g. the lions of 
'Born Free'. The arguments for this conservation can be viewed as partially related 
to the expression of individual human preferences which have seen the rise of 
conservation organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Economists 
were quick to recognise the role of these human preferences as an indicator which 
might be useful for policy purposes. This led to the development of conservation 
arguments based upon consequentialist reasoning. The most refined example is 
the use of the contingent valuation method to estimate the value of endangered 
species and suggest the extent to which resources should be used to prevent their 
extinction or reduce their rate of decline, e.g. elephants, whales, the corn crake and 
other birds. These studies are important in the debate over wildlife conservation 
because of the way in which they characterise the expression of concern. This 
consequentialist motive differs from ecological and non-consequentialist ethical 
motives. 
In the latter regard, this econOffilC viewpoint contrasts with an alternative 
expression of the need to conserve wildlife as found in animal rights. Animal 
rights also imply a position which falls far less comfortably under the title of 
34 
conservation. Conservation and consequentialism in essence allow for trade-offs 
in terms of species' freedoms and allow for individual animals to be treated as 
expendable. Even when the consequences for all species are to be taken into 
account a hierarchy of importance is nonnally imposed so that human welfare 
comes out on top. The expression of moral considerability under an animal rights 
perspective tends to deny what is regarded as an inequitable treatment of different 
speCles. However, when rights conflict a consequentialist approach may be 
invoked. Thus, the current concern for the rate of human induced specIes 
extinction centres the ethical debate on the conflict between human welfare and 
other species' needs. 
The complexity of detennining consequences, and an appeal to public preferences 
for guidance, has tended to lead wildlife conservation into focusing on key species 
to the neglect of wider concerns. Thus, the framing of the issue of wildlife 
conservation as species preservation can be contrasted both with the wider concern 
for biodiversity maintenance and with more narrow individual moral 
considerability. Concentration on biodiversity maintenance emphasises both 
genetic and ecosystem diversity but neglects the individual. lbis can be seen as 
consistent with the underlying driving force behind the emphasis of 1950s 
conservationists on specific species more as a means of avoiding reductions in 
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ecosystem diversity. Extinction of the wild lion and tiger is then only a symptom 
of the loss of entire ecosystems and a tool for their preservation. 
The modem environmental concern is more directly focused upon the less tangible 
aspects of wildlife conservation and less so on key species. In addition, ecological 
conservation is dynamic because it requires room for ecosystems and their 
components to change and adapt. In this way the ability of reflection upon 
supposedly static individual human preferences to inform public policy appears 
limited; a point some economists have been reluctant to admit. Wildlife 
conservation viewed as economically rational behaviour is far removed from 
modem wild land preservation with its emphasis on ecosystems functions and 
resilience where species come and go. Wildlife conservation as traditionally 
understood is then only a small part of that modem movement for environmental 
preservation and this can help explain why, for example, WWF now stands for 
World Wide Fund for Nature. 
The traditional wildlife conservation perspective may also conflict with some of 
the most deep-rooted concerns for the environment. For many the genesis of 
nature conservation lies in a desire to preserve a nature which is neither 
controlled nor fashioned by humans but is simply natural. But wildlife 
conservation as species preservation already implies an intervention in nature 
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which degrades this ideal. Preserving a 'wilderness' means preservtng a 
definite, delimited wilderness. Most starkly, the disappearance of a species can 
be a natural process of ecological evolution, and human attempts to counter that 
process seem to imply unnatural intervention. Rights for ecosystems to evolve 
and individual species to compete successfully may express the ecological 
perspective. This returns us to Leopold's land ethic, which seeks to preserve the 
diversity, integrity, beauty and authenticity of the natural environment, rather 
than having some fonn of humanitarian concern with individual animals. 
Reconciling wildlife conservation in tenns of species preservation with this 
genuinely ecological approach to nature may be impossible. Of course the 
immediate and pressing concern is over the rate of species extermination and its 
moral implications, but the wider meaning of conserving life which is wild also 
confronts conservationists on a daily basis. 
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